Fiscal Constitution Qualifications and Proposals


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Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10258175

Keywords:

Fiscal Constitution, Fiscal Rule, Constitutional Economics

Abstract

To ensure economic justice, fiscal discipline and sustainability, the economy needs to be managed in a fiscally responsible manner. Fiscal responsibility increases fiscal efficiency by promoting effective resource utilization. Underpinning all this is a fiscal constitution consisting of fiscal rules that aim to prevent discretionary government behavior from causing fiscal inefficiency. The purpose of enacting fiscal rules is to ensure fiscal discipline and sustainability of the state.

Constitutions are the most fundamental structures that can limit the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, the powers of the state are restricted only within the limits specified in the constitutions. In this framework, fiscal constitution is a concept that refers to limiting the state's spending, borrowing and taxation powers within the scope of the constitution. In this study, the concept of fiscal constitution, its elements and recommendations will be discussed

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Published

2023-11-30

How to Cite

Ergün, Y. (2023). Fiscal Constitution Qualifications and Proposals. Premium E-Journal of Social Science (PEJOSS), 7(36), 1643–1652. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10258175